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Abstract
We examine the Internet's impact on the cross-border distribution of cultural goods and
assess its implications for cultural policy and cultural diversity. We present a stylized model
of a two-country economy where governments are endowed with political preferences over the
consumption of domestic content and enact import barriers and subsidies to protect it. We
introduce peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing as a distinct distribution channel enabled by the Internet
that provides access to all media products at a low cost. We report two main ﬁndings. First,
the Internet renders legacy cultural policy ineﬃcient, and the elimination of import barriers
and the reduction of subsidized production can be desirable even when governments exhibit
paternalistic preferences favoring the consumption of domestic content. And second, even
though the Internet increases cultural diversity within countries, it can also reduce diversity
across them.
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1 Introduction
Online sharing of media content over ﬁle sharing networks has become pervasive during the last
decade. A prime example of the cross-border impact of online sharing is American television series
Game of Thrones. The series premiered in the US in 2011 and was broadcast in other countries
with delays ranging from one day in the UK to over a year in Japan, and soon attracted an in-
ternational following. With foreign audiences eager to watch every new episode, the number of
online sharing downloads in subsequent years often surpassed the prime time television audience
in the US.1 In 2015, the Guinness World Records named the show the most pirated television pro-
gram. In an attempt to circumvent unlicensed downloading the show is currently being broadcast
simultaneously in 173 countries, keeping fans in many timezones awake until late in the night and
featuring again in the 2016 Guinness World Records as the largest TV drama simulcast.
Online sharing has generated an active policy debate and a growing strand of academic liter-
ature, mostly focusing on sales displacement and the viability of traditional business models in
the content industry. The long-term implications of online sharing for cultural policy and cultural
diversity, in contrast, have received comparatively scarce attention. Domestic content is protected
in most countries by cultural policies dating back to the 1920s and beyond. These policies encom-
pass import barriers based on content quotas, which restrict commercial broadcasting of foreign
content such as Game of Thrones, as well as subsidies supporting the production of domestic
content. But these policies are under pressure from consumers empowered with online sharing to
download foreign content from the comfort of their homes. If online sharing can be understood
as a global distribution channel, what are the implications for traditional cultural policies and
consumption patterns in the cultural sector? And what are the long-term implications for cultural
diversity within and across nations? Because online sharing accounts for a signiﬁcant portion of
global content distribution and consumption, these are important policy questions.
We present a stylized model to evaluate the impact of online sharing on cultural policy and
diversity. We consider a two-country economy and model the cultural sector by means of oligopolis-
tic competition and variety-seeking consumers. We build our framework on the circular model of
spatial competition developed by Salop (1979), and characterize cultural goods by the absence of
marginal costs of production and the absence of export costs. We model cultural policy by endow-
ing governments with political preferences over their population's consumption of domestic and
foreign cultural content. If cultural goods portray national identity and values their consumption
will generate public externalities, so we assume governments internalize these externalities when
setting cultural policy. Governments can enforce content quotas to restrict the commercial dis-
tribution of foreign content and subsidize domestic producers to increase the number of domestic
content varieties available to consumers. We introduce online sharing as a cross-border distribution
channel that is broadly accessible and resilient to outside control. In our model, online sharing
1See `Game of Thrones most pirated TV show of 2014,' BBC News, December 28th 2014.
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allows consumers to access any media product at a low cost, and we assume such sharing cannot
be blocked or severely penalized in democratic countries due to technical or political reasons.2
Our analysis explains why traditional cultural policies are no longer eﬀective in the presence
of online sharing. We show that online sharing exerts downward pressure on content prices and
displaces demand from domestic content towards foreign content in countries that enforce content
quotas. Both eﬀects have implications for cultural policy. Quota enforcement becomes ineﬀective
and ineﬃcient. Ineﬀective because consumers can bypass commercial distribution restrictions
through online sharing, and ineﬃcient because consumers incur wasteful online sharing costs when
doing so. As a result, subsidized production volumes that could be sustained under eﬀective quota
enforcement are no longer eﬃcient; the supply of an increasing variety of content competing for
consumer attention reduces the optimal volume of domestic production. Thus we show that the
elimination of content quotas and the reduction of subsidized production can be desirable even
when governments exhibit paternalistic preferences favoring the consumption of domestic content.
Based on these results we evaluate the implications of online sharing for cultural diversity in the
world economy. We ask the following question: does online sharing increase or decrease cultural
diversity in the long-term? In other words, does the Internet drive consumers in diﬀerent countries
to increasingly consume the same content, or does it drive them into separate content niches?
To answer this question we use a fractionalization index and compare equilibrium consumption
patterns with and without online sharing accounting for the optimal policy responses. We ﬁnd that
online sharing homogenizes consumption patterns across countries and thereby reduces cultural
diversity. Our ﬁndings raise a question mark over the conventional wisdom that the Internet fosters
cultural diversity; where domestic protectionism is entrenched, online sharing can be understood
as an opening wedge for a global media distribution system.
Several simpliﬁcations are made to maintain tractability and derive these results. We focus
on the case where producers face zero marginal costs to provide an analysis that is relevant to
commercial digital distribution. The Salop model is well suited to this setting, unlike monopolistic
competition models where equilibrium prices and proﬁts collapse when marginal costs converge
to zero. To ensure tractability, we adopt the maximum diﬀerentiation principle where producers
locate their content varieties equidistantly along the perimeter of the Salop circle in each country.
This is consistent with the fact that equidistance has been shown to be an equilibrium outcome
of the location game. For our application, the assumption implies that producers can locate their
product independently in each country, or in other words, content can be tailored to diﬀerent
national audiences at a negligible cost. For example, movie trailers and posters tend to vary across
2Even in North Korea, a country operating under conditions of cultural autarky where consumption of foreign
content is severely punished, there are reports of growing demand for foreign content. Activists smuggle thousands
of USB sticks into the country each year loaded with Hollywood movies, South Korean TV shows, and other
material such as the Korean language version of Wikipedia. According to those involved in the trade, actors Arnold
Schwarzenegger, Leonardo DiCaprio, Sylvester Stallone, as well as US television series Desperate Housewives and
movies such as Spartacus or the Hunger Games are in high demand. See `North Korea campaigners seek USB
sticks,' BBC News, February 10th 2016.
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countries, and it is not infrequent for audio dubbing or post-production editing to cater to speciﬁc
markets.
Variety-seeking is the main driver of consumer demand in our model. In each country, the
consumer population as a whole exhibits preference for variety, and beneﬁts from consuming several
content varieties rather than concentrating consumption on a single variety. The number of content
varieties available to consumers within a country, or national diversity, will be a function of the
number of producers supplying content. Thus we take the view that unique artistic talent is the
fundamental driver of value creation. Consumers in our model exhibit no bias favoring domestic
content, so the country of origin of consumers and that of producers do not factor into consumption
utility. While these considerations are prone to aﬀect consumption choices in the market, we do
not incorporate them in our model. Instead, we focus on the simplest case of variety-seeking where
preferences are identical across countries to formalize our argument.
1.1 Cultural policy and online sharing
Content quotas are the most widespread import barrier in the cultural sector and play an important
role in our analysis. Content quotas emerged in the twentieth century with the expansion of cinema
and later television, which led to a growth of exports from the US to Europe and reversed the
historic direction of the ﬂow of culture. This triggered a widespread adoption of trade restrictions,
as shown in Table 1. Quotas have long been applied to cinema screens, TV channels, and radio
airplay. They stipulate a minimum share of cinema screenings for domestic content (or a minimum
share of broadcasting time over broadcasting channels), restricting the supply of foreign content
and thereby blocking some foreign content varieties from being commercialized. This is in contrast
to quantity-based quotas in other sectors of the economy, which restrict the number of units
imported but not the number of varieties (e.g., import barriers in the automobile sector reduce
the number of vehicles imported rather than their speciﬁc types).
Subsidies to sustain and promote the production of domestic cultural content are another
important element of cultural policy in many countries. For example, the EU's MEDIA program
and the Council of Europe's Eurimages cinema support fund actively subsidize European producers,
as do many national and regional programs. In fact, government intervention in the cultural sector
is so widespread that at the signing of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in
1995, fewer than 30 countries would commit to free trade in the audiovisual sector, and among
western democracies only the US and New Zealand liberalized the sector. The US has sought to
countermand such trends in recent trade negotiations, requesting provisions to ban barriers on
audiovisual electronic services.3
Several arguments have been proposed to explain the incentives for governments to increase
3See Bernier (2005) and Puppis (2008) for an overview of the evolution of trade agreements in the audiovisual
sector and their implications for digital distribution.
4
Country
Initial
Domestic content quota
quota
Australia 1927
Cinema: 15% of screenings
Radio: 25% of airplay time
Brazil 1926 Cinema: 63 days of screening
Canada 1956
TV: 60% of broadcast time
Radio: 35% of airplay time
China 1994 Cinema: 20 foreign ﬁlms per year
France 1920
Cinema: 110 non-EU ﬁlms per year
TV: 60% of broadcast time
Radio: 40% of airplay time
Malaysia 2005
Cinema: 14 days of screening
TV: 70% of broadcast time
Mexico 1949 Cinema: 10% of screenings
Nigeria n/a Radio: 80% of airplay time
South Africa 1997 Radio: 25% of airplay time
South Korea 1967
Cinema: 73 days of screening
TV: 80% of broadcast time
Spain 1955
Cinema: 73 days of screening
TV: 51% of broadcast time
Table 1: Content quotas applied to cinema screens, television broadcasting and radio airplay in
several countries. Source: Compiled by the authors.
exposure to domestic content. As pointed out by Noam (1991), these are rarely framed in economic
terms. A central argument in the debate is that media content can portray national identity and
values, so consumption of domestic content exhibits positive spill-overs for society and increases
social cohesion. The European Union's audiovisual media services Directive 2010/13/EU, for
instance, states that audiovisual media services are as much cultural services as they are economic
services. Their growing importance for societies, democracy [. . . ], education and culture justiﬁes
the application of speciﬁc rules to these services. Nonetheless, countervailing factors suggest that
the extreme case where no foreign content is consumed is unlikely to be desirable from a social
perspective either. Exposure to foreign content can foster cultural openness, increase human
capital, and facilitate trade. We build on this underlying tradeoﬀ between the consumption of
domestic and foreign content to model cultural policy.4
4Political preferences in our model can also be interpreted to originate from political economy tradeoﬀs. On the
one hand, the dispensation of protectionism favoring domestic producers may allow governments to manufacture
political consent domestically, providing leverage over the production of opinion-making content. On the other hand,
strong cultural intervention can compromise international diplomacy and trade negotiations in other areas. The
relative merit of public externalities vs. political economy factors in explaining incentives for cultural intervention
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The advent of consumer online sharing presents novel challenges for cultural policy. The
technology has evolved over several generations of Internet applications with newsgroups such
as Usenet, centralized server-based exchanges on private or public hosting sites, and peer-to-peer
ﬁle sharing (p2p) which emerged as the main driver of consumer online sharing in the last 15 years.
As of 2015, ﬁle sharing accounted for 14% of total consumer Internet traﬃc, and the most popular
ﬁle sharing application (BitTorrent) has been estimated to have over 266 million unique users per
month with 90% of the content exchanged being copyrighted.5 Despite its scale, online sharing has
so far proven to be exceptionally resilient to both technical and legal attacks. This has mainly been
due to technical workarounds implemented by p2p software developers, legal procedures requiring
judicial oversight on a case by case basis, and public resistance.
1.2 Literature
Online sharing relates to the literature on private copying and its impact on copyright holders.
Liebowitz (1985) observed that copying technologies increase the value of copyable originals, which
can be beneﬁcial to copyright holders. Besen and Kirby (1989) consider varying degrees of sub-
stitutability between originals and copies as well as the respective marginal costs of producing
them. Bakos, Brynjolfsson and Lichtman (1999) examine the size of consumer sharing groups such
as households or clubs when copies are perfect substitutes and copying costs fall to zero. Noam
(2008) analyzes online sharing as a mechanism for creating a critical mass and as a step towards
commercialization. This literature ﬁnds that private sharing can either harm or beneﬁt copyright
holders. For digital media content, online sharing exhibits high substitutability of originals and
copies as well as large scale sharing, so we may expect it to harm copyright holders as is the case
in our model.
Another literature strand has considered the implications of piracy for intellectual property
protection, mostly in the context of software. Yoon (2001) and Banerjee (2003) analyze the extent
to which government intervention to protect copyright holders is socially desirable. The optimal
degree of government protection is shown to depend on the cost of producing the content and
the cost incurred by producers to individually protect it in the market. Arai (2011) evaluates
whether the revenues from piracy ﬁnes should be collected by producers or by government in
order to maximize social welfare. This literature strand ﬁnds that some degree of government
protection is generally desirable. Our focus in this paper is on cultural policy rather than copyright
protection. To the extent that copyright protection is eﬀective in increasing the cost of online
sharing for consumers, our results suggest that it can complement cultural policies with the goal
remains a contentious issue, and for the purpose of our analysis it is suﬃcient to note that both interpretations are
compatible with the model.
5For Internet traﬃc composition estimates, see `Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Methodology,
2015-2020,' Cisco, June 2016. For BitTorrent userbase and content composition estimates see `Sizing the piracy
universe,' NetNames, September 2013 and `Census of Files Available via BitTorrent,' Freedom to Tinker blog of the
Center for Information Technology Policy at Princeton University, January 2010.
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of fostering consumption of domestic content. However, we note that the eﬀectiveness of penalties
against unauthorized ﬁle sharing is yet unclear. For instance, McKenzie (2016) reports no eﬀect
of graduated response programs (which penalize repeat ﬁle sharing oﬀenders) to raise box oﬃce
revenues of new ﬁlms.
Several contributions have examined the impact of online sharing in the music industry. Liebowitz
(2006) and Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2010) provide an overview of the literature analyzing
the empirical evidence on sales displacement. There is evidence supporting sales displacement for
commercially available content, though the estimated eﬀects vary signiﬁcantly across studies (a
typical estimate is a rate of 20%). The decrease in music sales has not resulted in a decrease in
production, however. Both Handke (2012) as well as Aguiar and Waldfogel (2016) report increased
production of music since the advent of ﬁle sharing technology, and suggest that lower costs of
production due to digitalization can contribute to explain the trend. Closer to the focus of our
paper, Ferreira and Waldfogel (2013) provide an empirical analysis of popular music charts from 22
countries. They evaluate the impact of digitalization on music trade patterns and ﬁnd that foreign
content has decreased in the chart rankings of most countries over the last decade. It is worth
noting that the dataset used in their study does not cover online sharing activity, so the ﬁndings
are not inconsistent with the predictions of the model derived below. Preferences for music may
also have a stronger domestic bias than those for other cultural goods, due to technical barriers to
translation and the complementarity of live performances.
We are aware of two instances in the literature that have formally analyzed content quotas
or online sharing in spatial competition models. Richardson (2006) examines a Hotelling model
where the programming choices of broadcasters (their location choices) contribute to determine
their advertising revenues, and shows that content quotas constraining programming can be so-
cially preferable to advertising caps or the introduction of a publicly provided broadcaster. Peitz
and Waelbroeck (2006) present a Salop model to analyze the impact of online sharing on a mul-
tiproduct monopolist. Online sharing enables consumers to sample products and identify their
preferred varieties, which increases their willingness to pay for originals and in some cases allows
the monopolist to proﬁt from online sharing.
Several contributions in the trade literature have examined the broader implications of trade
on culture. Francois and Ypersele (2002) show that in the presence of strong scale economies and
variations in the valuations of consumers for diﬀerent types of cultural goods, those enjoying more
uniform valuations can drive others out of the marketplace. Rauch and Trindade (2009) evaluate
trade dynamics when cultural goods diﬀer in their style owing to distinct national traditions. They
show that styles originating from large countries which enjoy larger network externalities can crowd
out production of other styles in the long term, so targeted subsidies promoting national styles in
small countries can increase world welfare. Bala and Long (2005) consider the dynamic eﬀects of
trade on cultural diversity based on price changes and the product preferences of consumers, and
argue that smaller countries can lose their cultural identity when engaging in trade with larger
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countries. Olivier, Thoenig and Verdier (2008) analyze a dynamic model where cultural identity is
also a consumption externality that consumers derive utility from, and show that both social and
product market integration between countries aﬀects the evolution of cultural identity. The above
contributions show that protectionist policies for cultural goods can be welfare-enhancing under
certain assumptions. Our paper is complementary in the sense that we show that online sharing
severely limits the eﬀectiveness of such policies.
The next section presents the building blocks of our model and characterizes the benchmark
cases of autarky and trade. Section 3 introduces political preferences for governments and char-
acterizes cultural policy based on content quotas. In Section 4, we introduce online sharing and
examine its short-term impact on cultural policy. We examine the long-term impact in Section 5
by endogenizing industry sizes and introducing subsidies. In Section 6 we evaluate the implications
for cultural diversity across countries using a fractionalization index. We consider extensions to
the model in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
2 Base model
We consider a world economy composed of two countries and a single media sector, such as the
motion picture industry. We focus on the symmetric case where both countries exhibit equivalent
consumer populations and industry sizes, which keeps the analysis simple given that our results
do not hinge on the comparative size of countries.
There is a unit mass of consumers in each country and we deﬁne consumer preferences for
media content over the unit length perimeter of a circle. The circle's perimeter provides a space
understood to capture the spectrum of consumer taste for media content, where products will
occupy distinct locations. It is useful to think of consumers in each country as located on a
separate circle, given that the set of products available in each country will vary throughout our
analysis. Consider the case of an individual consumer in country k ∈ {1, 2} located at a speciﬁc
point of the country's circle perimeter. The utility derived by the consumer from a product is
given by utility u and taste proximity, a measure of the ﬁt between the consumer's taste and the
particular product. This is calculated as the distance that separates the location of the consumer
and the product on the perimeter of the circle multiplied by taste parameter t. Thus a consumer's
ideal product is located at the exact same location as the consumer (maximum taste proximity),
and yields full utility u. More generally, the utility derived by consumer i when purchasing product
j at price pj, denoted by ui,j, is given by
ui,j = u− t di,j − pj, (1)
where di,j is the distance separating the respective locations of the consumer and the product on
the perimeter of the circle, and pj is the price of the product. The outside utility of not consuming
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is normalized to zero. Consumers have unit demand, and will either purchase a single product
or stay out of the market. This captures the fact that media consumption is limited by the time
constraints of consumers.
On the supply side, industry sizes are characterized by a pool of f producers in each country.
Each producer supplies a unique diﬀerentiated content variety in the world economy and incurs zero
marginal costs to distribute it to consumers. Similarly, there are no export costs when supplying
foreign countries. We start our analysis by taking industry sizes as exogenous and assuming that
producers face no ﬁxed costs, and will relax these assumptions in Section 5.
When positioning their product on the perimeter of the circle in each country, producer prof-
its will be determined by their proximity to neighboring varieties rather than by their absolute
position. We assume the maximum diﬀerentiation principle where producers locate their content
varieties equidistantly along the perimeter of the circle in each country.6 When the set of con-
tent varieties supplied in both countries coincides, each variety can be interpreted to occupy the
same position in both circles. When the set of content varieties supplied in both countries diﬀers,
producers ﬁne-tune the location of their products in each country's circle in order to maintain
equidistance with respect to neighboring varieties on its perimeter, so their position in both circles
may diﬀer.
To illustrate the mechanics of our model, we start by characterizing the benchmark cases
of autarky and trade. Both cases can be solved by applying standard Salop model derivations.
Consider the two-stage game where producers set prices for their content in each country in the
ﬁrst stage, and consumption decisions take place in the second stage. We restrict our analysis to
market conﬁgurations where there is eﬀective competition among producers, which requires that
all consumers purchase in equilibrium. Without loss of generality, let u = 1, then a suﬃcient
condition is f > 3
2
t.7 We assume this to be the case throughout our analysis.
Consumer demand. We proceed by backwards induction, and start by characterizing the
second stage purchasing decisions of consumers in country k ∈ {1, 2} when there are n content
varieties equidistantly located over the perimeter of the circle. Consider the demand for content
variety j when priced at pj,k and surrounded by neighboring varieties j − 1 and j + 1 priced at
pj−1,k and pj+1,k. When all consumers purchase and producers compete for market share we can
determine the demand for each content variety by comparing the utility that diﬀerent varieties
6The maximum diﬀerentiation principle was ﬁrst established by d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) in
the Hotelling model. Economides (1989) shows that maximum diﬀerentiation is a perfect equilibrium outcome in
the Salop model when ﬁrms choose where to locate their products and consumers exhibit quadratic transport costs.
We have solved our model with quadratic transport costs by substituting ui,j = u− t d2i,j − pj in (1) and found that
our qualitative results are unaﬀected, so we present the speciﬁcation with linear transport costs for simplicity. The
equidistance result also relies on the uniform distribution of consumers, which ensures that the location problem is
symmetric for ﬁrms. See Noam (1987) for an analysis of content diversity in a Hotelling model where consumers
are located following a normal distribution.
7The parameter constraint for this market conﬁguration to hold can be derived by substituting u = 1 in (1) and
equating ui,j = 0 for the consumer in the middle who is strictly indiﬀerent between the two neighboring varieties
given equilibrium prices in (3).
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deliver to consumers. Consider the consumer utility speciﬁcation in (1). The consumer located
at distance x from variety j over the perimeter of the circle who is indiﬀerent between purchasing
varieties j and j + 1 will be given by
t (x) + pj,k = t (
1
n
− x) + pj+1,k.
A symmetric condition identiﬁes the consumer who is indiﬀerent between varieties j and j − 1,
located at distance x from variety j. Solving for x and x, and given that total demand for content
variety j is driven by all consumers between x and x, that is x + x,
Dj,k =
n(pj−1,k + pj+1,k − 2pj,k) + 2 t
2 t n
. (2)
Content pricing. Consider next the ﬁrst stage pricing problem of producers in country k.
Given that marginal costs are zero each producer will choose its price pj,k to maximize revenues,
which are given by Dj,k · pj,k. Solving for the optimal price and equating prices across producers
for a symmetric pricing equilibrium yields
p(n) =
t
n
. (3)
Lemma 1. Under autarky, producers commercialize their content exclusively in their home coun-
try, nak = f , and prices are given by p
a
k = t/f . Under free trade, producers commercialize their con-
tent in both countries, nftk = 2f , and prices are given by p
ft
k = t/n
ft
k . Comparison of both regimes
shows that free trade reduces prices and increases national diversity in each country, pftk < p
a
k and
nftk > n
a
k.
Consumers purchase the content variety that is closest to their ideal location in equilibrium,
and all producers quote the same price in each national market deriving equal market share and
proﬁts. Prices are entirely determined by markup due to the absence of marginal costs, and increase
with consumer taste parameter t and decrease with industry size f , which jointly determine the
intensity of competition. A higher taste parameter t softens competition because consumers incur
higher disutility from consuming varieties distant from their ideal location. A larger industry size
f intensiﬁes competition because more content varieties are produced and therefore each variety
has closer substitutes.
Producers are willing to export their content whenever possible because they incur no export
costs in our model. Trade results in a higher number of content varieties being commercialized in
each country compared to autarky, increasing national diversity. The availability of a larger number
of content varieties increases consumer surplus, both by increasing the average taste proximity of
consumers and products and by lowering prices due to more intense competition. This results
in lower industry proﬁts relative to autarky. The net impact on social welfare is positive, and
thus free trade is desirable in the absence of political preferences such as those introduced in the
10
next section. It is worth stressing that consumers in our model care about their taste proximity
to content and not about its country of origin, so domestic and foreign content varieties derive
the same market share in each country. For the same reason, we refer to national diversity as a
function of the number of content varieties consumed, irrespectively of their origin.8
3 Cultural policy
In this section we analyze import barriers in the form of content quotas keeping industry sizes
ﬁxed. We endogenize industry sizes and introduce production subsidies in Section 5. We will refer
to the aggregate market share of domestic producers inside a country as the domestic cultural
share, and denote it by qk ∈ [0, 1]. A content quota qk (we denote domestic cultural shares and
quotas indistinctively by qk) is an import barrier that sets a domestic cultural share ﬂoor for
domestic producers, or equivalently, a market share ceiling 1− qk for foreign producers. If market
conditions drive the total market share of domestic producers below qk in their home country,
a quota is enforced by restricting the number of content varieties supplied by foreign producers
until domestic cultural share qk is met. Enforcement implies that some foreign producers are
excluded from the domestic market but others retain access. Because producers are homogeneous
in our model, we sidestep selection mechanisms and assume that exclusion is applied randomly
across foreign producers. Alternatively, enforcement can be interpreted as exclusion rotating across
products over time, with foreign producers having similar access windows to the market.
We incorporate political preferences in our model to explain cultural policy. First, note that
quota enforcement in a given country will restrict supply by foreign producers, which will increase
domestic producer proﬁts but reduce consumer surplus. The net eﬀect on social welfare is negative,
so governments must account for additional considerations if choosing to enforce content quotas.
We adopt the view that governments maximize both social welfare and cultural welfare within
their country. The latter is given by political preferences over cultural content consumption and
is assumed to depend on the audience's exposure to domestic and foreign content, that is, on the
domestic cultural share.
We deﬁne cultural welfare CWk in each country as a function of the domestic cultural share qk.
To provide a rich characterization of cultural policy we let CWk be inverse U-shaped in qk, and
consider the simplest speciﬁcation that meets these properties:9
8If consumers exhibit domestic bias, for example by deriving higher utility u > 1 from domestic varieties than
from foreign ones, producers would quote higher prices and obtain higher market shares in their domestic market
than in the foreign one. Vogel (2008) considers a richer circular model with heterogeneous producers and shows that
more eﬃcient producers choose higher qualities and set higher prices, deriving higher market shares and proﬁts than
less eﬃcient producers. Our model is simpler because consumers derive the same utility from all content varieties.
Also note that if domestic bias were large such that producers always enjoy a substantial market share advantage
in their domestic market, cultural policy interventions to increase their market shares and revenues such as those
introduced in Section 3 would be rendered unnecessary.
9Our speciﬁcation for CWk ensures that the government's objective function Gk is concave in qk. Note that
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CWk(qk) = 2 q
∗ qk − q2k. (4)
The speciﬁcation implies that cultural welfare is maximized at q∗ ∈ [0, 1] and the interpretation
is as follows. On the one hand, low domestic cultural shares qk < q
∗ are not optimal due to the
positive spill-overs that arise from the consumption of domestic content, which portrays national
identity and values and contributes to social cohesion. On the other hand, high domestic cultural
shares qk > q
∗ are suboptimal because consumption of foreign content is also desirable, as it fosters
cultural openness, increases human capital, and facilitates trade. Governments will account for this
tradeoﬀ, and will set content quotas to maximize their country's sum of consumer surplus, industry
proﬁts, and cultural welfare: the objective function of the government in country k, denoted by
Gk, will be given by Gk = CSk + Πk + CWk.
We next characterize both the unilateral regime where governments set quotas independently
as well as the multilateral regime where governments jointly set quotas to maximize world wel-
fare.10 We modify the timing of the game accordingly. In the ﬁrst stage, governments set quotas
qk either unilaterally or multilaterally. In the second stage, producers price their content in each
national market where it is commercialized. In the third stage, consumers observe content vari-
eties and prices available in their country and consumption decisions take place. Note that our
characterization of consumer demand in (2) and content prices in (3) carry over from the previous
section, so we directly proceed to analyze cultural policy in the ﬁrst stage of the game.
Cultural policy. Consider the impact of a quota qk in country k given the presence of f
producers in each country. Denote the industry share of country k in the world economy by q¯k,
which in the case of two symmetric countries is given by q¯k = 1/2. When the quota in country
k is below its industry share qk ≤ q¯k, the quota is met without enforcement and all producers
commercialize their content. When qk > q¯k, country k requires enforcement in order to meet the
quota. The number of foreign producers allowed to commercialize their content in country k is
restricted to ensure that nk = f/qk, where (f/qk)− f foreign producers are randomly selected to
commercialize their content and the remaining are excluded. Therefore, we restrict our analysis
to qk ∈ [q¯k, 1] given that quotas below the industry share of each country are equivalent to the
binding case qk = q¯k where there is no enforcement, nk(q¯k) = 2f .
We next characterize the objective function of governments. Consumer surplus in country k
when u = 1 and nk content varieties are available at prices p(nk) can be written as
simpler speciﬁcations for CWk (for example functions that are increasing in qk) tend to generate corner solutions with
either maximum enforcement or no enforcement, due to the fact that social welfare is convex in quota enforcement
qk. In these cases, cultural welfare either overrides social welfare considerations or has no cultural policy impact. A
rich characterization of cultural policy with an interior solution therefore requires an inverse U-shaped speciﬁcation
that captures the cultural downsides of high levels of enforcement.
10The multilateral regime is equivalent to the social planner's solution, and can be interpreted as the desirable
outcome of trade agreements between governments where losers are compensated in other areas. For example, in
the 2011 US-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, South Korea lowered import quotas on ﬁlm and on broadcasting
channels while the US lowered tariﬀs for textiles and electronics.
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CSk = 2nk
ˆ 1/2nk
0
1− t di − p(nk) ddi. (5)
Industry proﬁts will depend on quotas in both countries. In each country, producers with
market access obtain positive market shares and revenues, and producers excluded due to quota
enforcement derive no revenues. The proﬁts of producers based in country k given domestic and
foreign quotas qk and q−k will be given by
Πk = f [
1
nk
p(nk) +
(f/q−k)− f
f
1
n−k
p(n−k)]. (6)
Consider the problem of governments in the ﬁrst stage under the unilateral regime. Each
government unilaterally sets qk to maximize Gk = CSk + Πk +CWk given q−k. We can rewrite Gk
as a function of quotas by plugging in prices p(n) in (3) and substituting the number of varieties
by nk = f/qk. Maximizing Gk(qk, q−k) with respect to qk for each government and solving for qk
identiﬁes optimal unilateral quotas, which we denote by qˆuk and are given by
qˆuk =
8f q∗ − 5t
8(f − t) . (7)
Recall that the solution is only well deﬁned in the range qˆuk ∈ [q¯, 1], where qk = q¯ implies no quota
enforcement.
Consider next the problem of governments in the ﬁrst stage under the multilateral regime.
Governments jointly set q1 and q2 to maximize G1 + G2. Maximizing G1 + G2 with respect to q1
and q2 identiﬁes optimal multilateral quotas, denoted by qˆ
m
k ,
qˆmk = q
∗ − t
8f
, (8)
where the solution is well deﬁned in the range qˆmk ∈ [q¯k, 1]. Note that it is always the case that
qˆmk < 1.
Proposition 1. Content quotas under the unilateral (quk) and multilateral (q
m
k ) cultural policy
regimes in each country are given by
quk =

q¯k if qˆ
u
k ≤ q¯k(no enforcement)
qˆuk if qˆ
u
k ∈ (q¯k, 1)(enforcement)
1 if qˆuk ≥ 1(cultural autarky)
qmk =
q¯k if qˆmk ≤ q¯k(no enforcement)qˆmk otherwise (enforcement)
where the number of content varieties commercialized in country k is given by nk = f/qk, and
prices are given by pk = t/nk.
Compared to the free trade equilibrium, quota enforcement reduces national diversity and in-
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creases prices. This reduces domestic consumer surplus but increases domestic industry proﬁts as
well as national cultural welfare.
The result provides a rationale for content quotas in the cultural sector. Governments enforce
content quotas whenever domestic cultural shares under free trade conditions are low relative to
the preferred domestic share q∗. Enforcement has several eﬀects. On the one hand, enforcement
increases consumption of domestic content varieties, which increases cultural welfare and domestic
industry proﬁts. On the other hand, it reduces national diversity and drives up prices, and therefore
lowers consumer surplus. Governments account for these factors, so equilibrium quotas depend
on the preferred domestic share q∗ as well as on consumer taste parameter t and industry size f .
Note that free trade is the special case of no enforcement in both countries, qk = q¯k, and autarky
is the special case of maximum enforcement where qk = 1.
Equilibrium quotas diﬀer in both regimes. In the unilateral regime, where governments set
quotas independently, each government decides how close to set the level of enforcement to the
preferred domestic cultural share q∗. In doing so, each government weighs the positive impact
of enforcement on domestic producer proﬁts against the negative impact on consumer surplus.
When the preferred domestic cultural share is low (q∗ < 5
8
), producer proﬁt gains do not oﬀset
consumer surplus losses and governments choose to soften enforcement (quk < q
∗). When the
preferred domestic cultural share is high (q∗ > 5
8
) producer proﬁt gains oﬀset consumer surplus
losses and governments are willing to engage in higher levels of enforcement (quk > q
∗).11
In the multilateral regime, where both governments jointly set quotas, the negative impact
of enforcement on the foreign country is also internalized. Quota enforcement generates negative
externalities across countries because it reduces the proﬁts of foreign producers. As a result,
multilateral quotas are always lower than unilateral quotas and below the preferred domestic
cultural share in each country (qmk < q
∗). The left panel in Figure 1 depicts equilibrium quotas
under both regimes, and the right panel illustrates their eﬀect on the number of content varieties
commercialized.
In our above analysis, we have considered the simplest exclusion mechanism where commercial
slots are randomly assigned to foreign producers. A richer model may consider the case where slots
are auctioned. Our assumption that slots are assigned randomly allows us to ignore the question
of how the revenues from such an auction may be used. For example, France levies a tax on
cinema admissions and redirects the revenues to subsidize domestic production. Such mechanisms
appropriate welfare from foreign producers, and would lead to higher equilibrium quotas in a
unilateral regime. Furthermore, the selection mechanism has no impact in our model because
producers are homogeneous. If producers were heterogeneous in the quality of their content, we
11The result follows from the fact that social welfare is convex in quota enforcement qk with a minimum at qk =
5
8 .
On the one hand, consumer surplus decreases linearly with qk as less content varieties are commercialized at higher
prices. On the other hand, domestic producer proﬁts increase quadratically with qk as producers increase prices as
well as gain market share from foreign producers. As a result, the impact of social welfare on the precise level of
quota enforcement diﬀers in the low and high qk ranges.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium quotas under the unilateral and multilateral regimes (left) and national
diversity under both regimes (right).
should expect an auction to select content varieties of higher quality for commercialization (such as
Game of Thrones on television, for example). Foreign varieties would then derive higher average
market shares than domestic varieties, which on average would be of lower quality, and the degree
of enforcement required to meet a certain domestic cultural share target would also be higher than
in our preceding analysis.12
4 The short-term eﬀect of online sharing
We introduce online sharing into our model of the cultural sector. We model online sharing as
an eﬃcient distribution mechanism that scales beyond borders and enables consumers to access
any content variety produced.13 We keep industry sizes ﬁxed to analyze the short-term impact of
online sharing on consumption patterns and cultural policy, and in the next section, we endogenize
industry sizes to evaluate the long-term impact.
Online sharing presents a non-negligible cost for consumers in the form of computing resources
and bandwidth, and we denote this cost by o. We assume that o < o¯ so that the cost of online
12We have also explored the case where countries are asymmetric. If industry sizes diﬀer, it can be shown that the
country with the smaller industry engages in a higher degree of quota enforcement. This follows from the fact that a
lower industry share in the world economy results in a lower domestic cultural share in the absence of enforcement.
As a result, the small industry government is more willing to engage in enforcement and may do so even when
the large industry government does not. The asymmetry also implies that the small industry government needs to
block a larger number of foreign content varieties than the large industry government to achieve the same domestic
cultural share.
13We abstract from modeling the precise exchange mechanism that underlies online sharing and simply assume
that it is self-sustainable and eﬃcient. For a detailed analysis of the underlying mechanism and a characterization of
its performance, see Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2009). File sharing networks are shown to be sustain-
able in the presence of selﬁsh participants who care only about their own access to content, and the decentralized
architecture of the networks implies that participants eﬀectively share the costs incurred to enable the content
exchange.
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sharing for consumers is strictly lower than commercial distribution prices under free trade, where
o¯ = t/2f . This captures the empirically relevant case where the eﬃciency of online sharing
is a threat to commercial distribution, and maintains tractability by ensuring that equilibrium
prices are symmetric across producers.14 The timing of the game carries over from the previous
section. In what follows, we consider the benchmark case where all consumers have access to online
sharing, which is facilitated by the uptake of high-speed Internet access as well as the adoption of
digital formats in commercial distribution. In Section 7 we relax this assumption and discuss the
robustness of our ﬁndings when a part of the consumer population does not have access to online
sharing.
Consumer demand with online sharing. We proceed to characterize consumer demand
in the third stage independently of how it is served, either through commercial distribution or
through online sharing. If content variety j is distributed commercially in country k at price pj,k,
consumers demanding the product in country k will compare price pj,k with online sharing cost
o. If pj,k ≤ o, consumers will prefer to purchase the product through the commercial channel
(assuming tie-breaking in favor of commercial distribution), and if pj,k > o they will prefer to
obtain the product through online sharing. Let p¯j,k identify the lowest eﬀective price of content
variety j in country k for consumers, p¯j,k = min[pj,k, o]. If content variety j is not commercially
distributed in country k due to quota enforcement, let p¯j,k = o. Following our earlier demand
derivation in (2), the demand for content variety j in country k when n varieties are accessible to
consumers will be given by
Dosj,k =
n(p¯j−1,k + p¯j+1,k − 2 p¯j,k) + 2 t
2 t n
.
Content pricing with online sharing. Consider the pricing problem of producer j in the
second stage when commercializing its content in country k in the presence of online sharing.
All content varieties produced are accessible to consumers, nosk = 2f , and neighboring varieties
may be available through commercial distribution or only through online sharing (if under quota
enforcement in country k). Clearly, producer j will quote a price pj,k ≤ o, as otherwise demand
for variety j will be fully served through online sharing. Producer j chooses price posj,k to maximize
revenues Dosj,k · posj,k under the restriction posj,k ≤ o, which given the eﬀective price of neighboring
varieties p¯j−1,k and p¯j+1,k yields
14Note that producers cannot compete against free in our model. If online sharing costs fall to zero for consumers,
o = 0, producers obtain zero proﬁts. However, online sharing presents non-negligible costs for consumers and should
not be interpreted to be free. If the cost of online sharing for consumers is high, o > o¯, then producers undercut
online sharing when pricing their content and commercial distribution becomes comparatively more attractive. The
characterization of equilibrium prices is complex because of the asymmetries that arise across producers and which
in turn depend on the precise ordering of varieties across the perimeter of the circle. It should be clear, however,
that demand increases for content varieties which are commercially available and decreases for those that are not.
If the cost of online sharing is exceedingly high, o o¯, no consumers engage in online sharing.
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posj,k =
o if pˆj,k ≥ opˆj,k otherwise (9)
where
pˆj,k =
p¯j−1,k + p¯j+1,k
4
+
t
4f
.
Consider the implications of the optimal pricing strategy of producer j in country k. The optimal
pricing strategy described by (9) implies price posj,k = o when both neighboring varieties j − 1 and
j + 1 are eﬀectively priced at o. To see this, note that pˆj,k > o if p¯j−1,k = p¯j+1,k = o because
o < o¯ = t/2f . If neighboring variety j − 1 (or variety j + 1) is priced below o, then pˆj,k > p¯j−1,k
(respectively pˆj,k > p¯j+1,k). Therefore, in a symmetric pricing equilibrium, all producers match
online share cost when pricing their content by setting posj,k = o.
Cultural policy with online sharing. We next characterize the objective function of gov-
ernments in the presence of online sharing, Gosk . Consumer surplus and industry proﬁts with online
sharing can be derived from CSk in (5) and Πk in (6) by substituting the number of content vari-
eties nk with n
os
k and prices p(nk) with p
os
j,k = o. Cultural welfare with online sharing is given by
CWk in (4) accounting for the fact that quota enforcement is ineﬀective, so the domestic cultural
share is given by the industry share. This obtains,
CSosk =2n
os
k
ˆ 1/2nosk
0
1− t di − o ddi
Πosk =f [
1
nosk
o +
(f/q−k)− f
f
1
nos−k
o]
CW osk =2 q
∗ q¯k − q¯2k.
(10)
Consider the problem of governments in the ﬁrst stage. In the unilateral regime, each gov-
ernment sets quotas independently to maximize Gosk . Inspection reveals that G
os
k /∂qk = 0, given
that quota enforcement is ineﬀective. Therefore, any quota level constitutes a unilateral equilib-
rium. In the multilateral regime, governments jointly maximize Gos1 +G
os
2 . Inspection reveals that
∂(Gos1 + G
os
2 )/∂qk < 0 for qk ≥ q¯k, so the multilateral equilibrium implies no quota enforcement.
Proposition 2. The advent of online sharing ensures that all content varieties are consumed in
each country and producers match online sharing cost when commercializing their content, nosk = 2f
and posk = o. If governments cannot block or disproportionately penalize online sharing, o < o¯,
the multilateral response to online sharing implies the elimination of content quotas, qos,mk = q¯k.
Legacy cultural policy is an ineﬃcient status quo because governments lack the unilateral incentives
to eliminate them, qos,uk ∈ [q¯k, 1].
Online sharing has two main eﬀects on the cultural sector in the short-term: a content pricing
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eﬀect that exerts downward pressure on prices, and a demand displacement eﬀect that increases
foreign content consumption in countries that enforce quotas. The ﬁrst eﬀect drives producers
to cut prices in order to match the cost of online sharing for consumers. This ensures commer-
cial distribution remains competitive, so that consumers purchase content which is commercially
distributed in their country instead of accessing it through online sharing. Moreover, note that
producers match the cost of online sharing irrespectively of consumer's willingness to pay: even
if producers could beneﬁt from regional pricing by setting country-speciﬁc prices (for instance if
consumers in both countries diﬀer in their taste parameter t), online sharing would homogenize
prices across countries.
The second eﬀect arises under quota enforcement and is driven by consumers resorting to online
sharing to access foreign content varieties that better match their taste but are not commercialized
in their country. This displaces demand from domestic content (otherwise served by commercial
distribution) to foreign content accessed through online sharing, rendering content quotas ineﬀec-
tive. The eﬀect is consistent with the higher usage of online sharing reported for countries with
limited commercial provision of streaming services and digital content catalogs. It is also consistent
with the observation that US television series, which are frequently subject to quota restrictions or
delayed broadcast on foreign television channels (as illustrated by the case of Game of Thrones),
are among the most downloaded content over online sharing.
Our analysis reveals an important implication of online sharing for cultural policy. If such shar-
ing cannot be blocked or disproportionately penalized, it provides a rationale for the elimination of
content quotas even when cultural welfare is at stake in each country. The elimination of content
quotas is desirable because online sharing renders them both ineﬀective and ineﬃcient. Ineﬀective
because consumers choose to bypass them, and ineﬃcient because consumers incur wasteful online
sharing costs when doing so. These costs represent a welfare loss borne by foreign producers who
would otherwise sell their content to consumers. And precisely because the welfare loss is borne
by foreign producers, Proposition 2 shows that countries lack unilateral incentives to eliminate
content quotas. Legacy cultural policy is therefore a non-desirable status quo, and dismantling
import barriers may require a cooperative approach among countries. Based on the assumption
that such cooperation will prevail in the long-term, we next examine the implications of online
sharing for industry sizes in the cultural sector.
5 The long-term eﬀect of online sharing
This section endogenizes industry sizes and introduces production subsidies to evaluate the long-
term eﬀect of online sharing on the volume of production. We build on these results in the next
section to analyze the impact of online sharing on cultural diversity in the world economy. To
endogenize industry sizes, we introduce a ﬁxed cost of production c for producers and incorporate
entry decisions into the model. We consider both the case of competitive entry and the case of
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subsidized entry. The former characterizes industry sizes based on the individual entry decisions
of producers. The latter characterizes optimal industry sizes assuming governments intervene to
sustain them by subsidizing producers or restricting entry if necessary.
We incorporate entry decisions into the timing of the game as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, under
competitive entry, potential entrants in both countries simultaneously choose whether to enter the
sector or to stay out. Under subsidized entry, industry sizes are jointly chosen by governments
to maximize world welfare.15 In the second stage, governments set quotas. In the third stage
producers price their content, and in the fourth stage consumption decisions take place. Note that
in order to solve the game we need to make assumptions about how quotas are set in the second
stage. When there is no online sharing, we assume for consistency that quotas are set unilaterally
under competitive entry and multilaterally under subsidized entry. We focus on the empirically
relevant case where cultural policy mandates enforcement, a suﬃcient condition in a two-country
economy is q∗ > 5
8
. In the presence of online sharing, following our results in the previous section,
we assume that content quotas are eliminated.16
The focus of the exercise is to compare equilibrium industry sizes before and after online
sharing within each regime, so we restrict our analysis to symmetric allocations where industry
sizes coincide in both countries. Also note that we keep production cost c constant before and after
online sharing. This ensures that we isolate the impact of online sharing from other technological
shifts that may aﬀect the production process.
Industry sizes with competitive entry. In the absence of online sharing, the solution to the
second, third, and fourth stages of the game carries over from Proposition 1. Denote equilibrium
industry sizes by f c, and note that quotas will coincide across both countries in a symmetric entry
equilibrium. Industry proﬁts are given by Πk in (6) and the solution is characterized by a zero
proﬁt condition for producers in each country, Πk(f
c)/f c = c. This ensures that f c potential
entrants choose to enter in each country and the remaining stay out. Substituting equilibrium
varieties nk and prices pk from Proposition 1 in the zero proﬁt condition and solving for f
c obtains
the following implicit equation,
f c =
√
t · quk (f c)
c
, (11)
where quotas quk are given by the unilateral solution in Proposition 1. We show in the Appendix
that this equation identiﬁes a unique solution for f c.
15We do not solve the case where governments choose industry sizes unilaterally. We have analyzed the entry
problem extensively, but unfortunately found this case to be intractable due to the complexity of government best-
responses in the ﬁrst stage. We nonetheless expect our qualitative results for the multilateral regime stated in
Proposition 3 to also hold in the unilateral regime, given that the same quota mechanism is present in both cases.
16As noted in Proposition 2, content quotas are ineﬀective and ineﬃcient in the presence of online sharing and
therefore we do not expect them to remain enforced in the long-term. If quotas were nonetheless enforced, they would
reduce producer revenues and drive consumers to incur wasteful online sharing costs, strengthening Proposition 3
by further reducing equilibrium industry sizes with online sharing, fos,c and fos,m.
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Consider next competitive entry in the presence of online sharing, to be denoted by f os,c. The
solution to the third and fourth stages of the game carries over from Proposition 2. Industry
proﬁts are given by Πosk in (10), and there is no quota enforcement in the second stage (quotas are
eliminated), qk = q¯k. Substituting equilibrium varieties n
os
k from Proposition 2 in the zero proﬁt
condition Πosk (f
os,c)/f os,c = c identiﬁes the following entry solution
f os,c =
o
c
. (12)
Industry sizes with subsidized entry. In the absence of online sharing, the solution to the
second, third, and fourth stages of the game carries over from Proposition 1. Denote equilibrium
industry sizes under subsidized entry by fm. In the ﬁrst stage, governments choose industry sizes
to jointly maximize G1+G2−(f1+f2)c. Substituting f1 = f2 = f , plugging in content varieties nk
and prices pk from Proposition 1, and solving for ∂(G1 +G2 − 2 f c)/∂f = 0 obtains the following
implicit equation
fm =
√
t · qmk (fm)
4c
, (13)
where quotas qmk are given by the multilateral solution in Proposition 1. We show in the Appendix
that this equation identiﬁes a unique maximum for fm.
Consider next optimal industry sizes in the presence of online sharing, to be denoted by f os,m.
Governments jointly maximize Gos1 + G
os
2 − (f1 + f2)c. Substituting f1 = f2 = f , plugging in
content varieties nosk from Proposition 2, and solving for ∂(G
os
1 +G
os
2 − 2 f c)/∂f = 0 identiﬁes two
candidate solutions. It can be shown that only the following solution is a maximum,
f os,m =
t
2
√
2ct
. (14)
Inspection of the above entry solutions yields the following result.
Proposition 3. Online sharing reduces industry sizes in the long-term both under competitive
entry and under subsidized entry, f os,c < f c and f os,m < fm. National diversity decreases un-
der competitive entry if ﬁxed costs are high, nosk (f
os,c) < nk(f
c) if c > (5o−4q
∗)o2
(2o−1)t , and otherwise
increases. National diversity always increases under subsidized entry, nosk (f
os,m) > nk(f
m).
Online sharing always reduces industry sizes in the long-term. Under competitive entry, the
reduction is driven by the content pricing eﬀect (lower prices) and the demand displacement eﬀect
(lower market shares) discussed in the previous section. Both of these eﬀects reduce the revenues
derived by producers. A countervailing eﬀect is present in the long-term, given that the elimination
of content quotas ensures that producers always derive revenues from foreign consumers. This third
eﬀect, however, is insuﬃcient to oﬀset the previous two. The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates why
less producers are willing to enter the sector as a result: the revenues derived by each producer
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Figure 2: Equilibrium industry sizes under competitive entry (left) and subsidized entry (right).
(net of ﬁxed costs) are lower with online sharing than without online sharing for any given industry
size, Πosk (f)/f < Πk(f)/f , and therefore the number of producers covering ﬁxed production cost c
in equilibrium is lower.
Online sharing also reduces industry sizes under subsidized entry. This result is independent of
the shifts in producer revenues discussed above for the case of competitive entry, because govern-
ments redistribute surplus between consumers and producers in order to sustain optimal industry
sizes under intervention. Instead, the result is driven by the lack of eﬀective quota enforcement
in the presence of online sharing. First, note that an optimal volume of production exists in the
world economy, which results from the inherent tradeoﬀ between consumer preferences for content
variety and the costs of producing such variety. This tradeoﬀ is aﬀected by quota enforcement.
Enforcement increases optimal industry sizes because it restricts the number of (foreign) content
varieties supplied in each country. Online sharing, in turn, renders enforcement ineﬀective and
thereby reduces optimal industry sizes. The right panel of Figure 2 plots the objective function of
governments as a function of industry size both without online sharing (when quotas are enforced),
G1 + G2 − 2 f c, and with online sharing (when there is no enforcement), Gos1 + Gos2 − 2 f c. Each
curve represents the total welfare frontier, including both social welfare and cultural welfare. It can
be readily veriﬁed that optimal industry sizes are always lower in the presence of online sharing.
Online sharing reduces industry sizes under both regimes, but this need not result in lower
national diversity. Although the number of content varieties produced in the world economy is
lower, improved consumer access to foreign varieties can result in a higher number of content
varieties consumed in each country. Thus consumers may ﬁnd that online sharing increases their
available media choices. We ﬁnd that this is always the case under subsidized entry, where online
sharing increases national diversity. However, the eﬀect can go in either direction under competitive
entry. If production cost c is high, national diversity goes down. And conversely, if production cost
c is low, national diversity goes up. Intuitively, improved access to foreign varieties only oﬀsets
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the decrease in production when the cost of production is low. In the next section, we explore the
eﬀect of online sharing on world diversity and show that it need not go in the same direction as
that of national diversity.
The long-term impact of online sharing on social welfare can be shown to go in the same
direction as its impact on national diversity under both regimes. Thus online sharing increases
social welfare if (and only if) it increases national diversity. The long-term impact on cultural
welfare is always negative, because online sharing drives domestic cultural shares down to free
trade levels. Accounting for both eﬀects, it can be shown that online sharing reduces total welfare
in the world economy. The reduction in cultural welfare always oﬀsets the potential increase in
social welfare. As depicted in the right panel of Figure 2, online sharing shifts down the total
welfare frontier in the world economy.
It is also of interest to compare the long-term outcome with online sharing to that of free
trade. Both scenarios have in common the absence of import barriers, though it is important
to stress that such barriers would not be eliminated if online sharing were not present (i.e., free
trade is not an equilibrium outcome in our model given the political preferences of governments).
Under competitive entry conditions, the fundamental diﬀerence with respect to free trade is that
producers are forced to set lower prices with online sharing due its low cost for consumers, o < o¯.
This results in a lower volume of production than that predicted by the free trade equilibrium.
Under subsidized entry, optimal industry sizes coincide in both cases due to the absence of import
barriers. However, the subsidies required to sustain these industry sizes will always be higher in the
presence of online sharing because of the lower revenues derived by producers in the marketplace.
Note that this also applies to our main results discussed above. Online sharing reduces the optimal
volume of production under subsidization, but it may well be the case that higher subsidies are
required to sustain lower production targets given its impact on commercial revenues.
6 Diversity in the world economy
Our analysis has so far characterized the impact of online sharing on content diversity within
countries. In this section we use a fractionalization index to examine its impact on diversity across
countries. This family of indices measures the probability that individuals randomly picked from
diﬀerent populations share the same trait, and has been readily applied in the empirical literature
on cultural diversity, see for instance Alesina et al. (2003). In our application, we will measure the
probability that consumers randomly picked from diﬀerent countries consume the same content.
Based on our characterization of long-term outcomes in the previous section, we will compute the
value of the index for the world economy with and without online sharing. If online sharing drives
consumers in diﬀerent countries to increasingly consume the same content, reducing the value of
the index, then online sharing reduces world diversity. And conversely, if it drives consumers in
diﬀerent countries to consume diﬀerent content, increasing the value of the index, then online
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sharing increases world diversity.17
Denote by sj,k the market share of content variety j in country k when the total number of
varieties produced is given by 2f . We measure world diversity with the following fractionalization
index FR,
FR =
1
2f
∑
(1− sj,1 · sj,2).
The index is a direct extension of the Herﬁndahl concentration index to the case of two countries,
subtracted from 1 to measure diversity or absence of concentration and normalized by the number
of products. It obtains a minimum value of zero (no diversity) when consumption is concentrated
on a single and common product across both countries. The value of the index increases when
more products are consumed or when the set of products consumed diﬀers across countries. To
see the ﬁrst eﬀect, consider the case where the exact same mix of products is consumed in both
countries, sj,1 = sj,2 =
1
2f
, so that FR = 1− ( 1
2f
)2. Clearly, FR is then increasing in f . To see the
second eﬀect, note that FR obtains the maximum value of 1 when there is no overlap among the
set of products consumed in both countries, when sj,1 · sj,2 = 0 for all products.
World diversity. We ﬁrst characterize the fractionalization index in the absence of online
sharing. Under quota enforcement in country k, the probability that any given content variety
from the foreign country is commercialized is given by (nk − fk)/f−k, and all commercialized
varieties derive equal market shares. Therefore,
FR =
1
f1 + f2
[f1(1− 1
n1
· 1
n2
n2 − f2
f1
) + f2(1− 1
n2
· 1
n1
n1 − f1
f2
)].
Denote the value of the index in the absence of online sharing by WD. Substituting nk from
Proposition 1, and equating q1 = q2 = q and f1 = f2 = f to account for symmetric equilibria
obtains
WD =
f 2 − (1− q)q
f 2
.
Consider next the fractionalization index in the presence of online sharing. All content varieties
produced are consumed in both countries and derive equal market shares in each of them,
FR =
1
f1 + f2
[(f1 + f2)(1− 1
f1 + f2
· 1
f1 + f2
)].
We denote the value of the index in the presence of online sharing byWDos. Equating f1 = f2 = f
os
17Note that this is the same criteria we have used to characterize diversity within countries. When the number of
content varieties consumed within a country increases, the probability that randomly picked consumers within the
country consume the same content decreases. Thus national diversity increases. And conversely, when the number
of content varieties consumed decreases, so does national diversity. The eﬀect can be formalized with a standard
concentration index, though we have stated the results based on the number of varieties for simplicity given that
all content varieties derive equal market shares in equilibrium.
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to account for symmetric equilibria yields
WDos =
1
1− 4(f os)2 .
Inspection of WD and WDos accounting for the fact that q ∈ [1
2
, 1] and f > f os delivers the
following result.
Proposition 4. Online sharing reduces cultural diversity in the world economy, WDos < WD.
Online sharing reduces cultural diversity across countries in our model. This follows from the
two mechanisms at play identiﬁed in our analysis: online sharing renders import barriers ineﬀective
and also reduces the volume of production. The lack of eﬀective import barriers (either due to
consumers bypassing them or their formal dismantlement) homogenizes consumption patterns
across countries. The reduction in the volume of production concentrates consumption within
each country on a smaller number of content varieties. Both eﬀects reduce cultural diversity in
the world economy. Simply stated, our model predicts that online sharing increases the share of
consumers in diﬀerent countries consuming the same content.
The result is driven by the underlying preference structure in our model. In each country,
the consumer population is variety-seeking and therefore willing to consume all content varieties
produced in the world economy. When some content varieties are unavailable in some countries
due to import barriers, a mechanism such as online sharing that eliminates these barriers ensures
that consumption patterns converge across countries. It is worth noting that the reduction in the
index does not require preferences to be identical across countries, as is the case in our model. It is
suﬃcient that there is demand in each country for content varieties produced in the other, even if
weaker than demand for domestic content. If this demand is served only in the presence of online
sharing such that convergence in consumption patterns increases, then the cultural diversity index
will decrease.
7 Extensions
Some of the simplifying assumptions present in our model merit additional discussion in light of
recent trends observed in the cultural sector. On the one hand, content quotas in cinema, TV, and
radio remain in place in many countries. On the other hand, streaming services such as Netﬂix
or Spotify bypass these import barriers and continue to gain market share. We next enrich our
model to explain and reconcile these trends. We consider the case where commercial distribution
and online sharing are not perfect substitutes for all consumers and where additional distribution
channels coexist.
Our base model assumes that online sharing is pervasive and all consumers access it at cost o.
But some consumers may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to access online sharing because they are not digitally
24
savvy, their Internet connection is slow or their computing devices unsuitable, or they face the risk
of high ﬁnes or reputational costs. To account for these factors in our model we let a share s of
the population be composed of e-savvy consumers, who can access online sharing at cost o, and
assume the remaining e-unsavvy consumers cannot access online sharing (or face an arbitrarily
high cost of access).18
To explore the implications of streaming services we consider the case where two commercial
distribution channels coexist. As in our preceding analysis, there is a traditional distribution
channel accessible to all consumers and subject to content quotas where each producer prices their
content. In addition, we introduce an online streaming service accessible only to e-savvy consumers
that provides access to all content varieties for a ﬁxed subscription price. The streaming service
incurs zero marginal costs and the subscription price is set by producers, who share the revenues
of the service according to the consumption of their content. Note that consumers have single-
unit demand in our model, so the streaming service will not aﬀect the volume of content consumed
(that is, consumers will subscribe to access only their preferred content variety). The simpliﬁcation
ignores a relevant aspect of subscription services but is convenient given that our focus is to examine
their impact on cultural policy and diversity.
In this setting, it can be shown that producers quote the same price in the traditional distri-
bution channel as in our base model (as given in Proposition 1) and price the streaming service
to match online sharing cost o. Both distribution channels coexist and serve diﬀerent consumer
segments, with traditional distribution servicing e-unsavvy consumers and the streaming service
servicing e-savvy consumers. Producer proﬁts are strictly higher than in the base model due to
eﬀective price discrimination, given that e-unsavvy consumers do not have access to the streaming
service.19
Consider the implications for cultural policy and diversity. The government objective function
in this extended model can be written as follows:
CSek =sCS
os
k + (1− s)CSk
Πek =s o + (1− s)Πk
CW ek =sCW
os
k + (1− s)CWk.
(15)
Inspection reveals the following properties. Quota enforcement remains eﬀective because it in-
18In this extended model, the number of content varieties available to e-savvy and e-unsavvy consumers will
diﬀer whenever some varieties are only accessible through online sharing. Our analysis in this section is based
on the assumption that consumer demand for each segment is determined by the number of varieties available to
that segment, i.e., the number of products present on the perimeter of the circle diﬀers for e-savvy and e-unsavvy
consumers within each country.
19Note that there is no online sharing in equilibrium because all e-savvy consumers purchase the streaming
service. More generally, with a continuum of consumer types who diﬀer in their online sharing cost, producer
pricing may tolerate some degree of online sharing such that it coexists with commercial distribution in equilibrium.
See Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2009) for a pricing analysis of this scenario with endogenous market
coverage and online sharing performance.
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creases the exposure of e-unsavvy consumers to domestic content. Governments therefore enforce
quotas both in the unilateral and multilateral regimes, though this results in lower cultural welfare
gains than in the base model because e-savvy consumers are unaﬀected by enforcement. The result
provides a rationale for the persistence of content quotas in the presence of online sharing: there
are beneﬁts to enforcement for the population that lacks online sharing access. And conversely,
there are no gains to enacting import barriers on streaming services because their customers will
resort to online sharing for content that is commercially unavailable.
Industry sizes are higher than those predicted in our base model. Producer proﬁts are higher,
as noted above, given that e-unsavvy consumers are charged higher prices. This results in more
producers entering the market under competitive entry, and optimal industry sizes in a subsidized
regime are also higher due to the eﬀects of quota enforcement. Cultural diversity is also reduced
by online sharing in the extended model. The market shares of foreign content varieties increase
in every country with online sharing, and streaming services satisfy most of the demand for these
varieties.
Finally, we note that as the share of consumers with online access grows, s → 1, the outcome
converges to that of our base model. Import barriers and consumption patterns in the traditional
distribution channel are unaﬀected by online sharing but represent a decreasing share of overall
trade. In contrast, streaming services provide a growing share of the population with unrestricted
access to a larger pool of content at lower prices, thereby delivering the beneﬁts of online sharing
to consumers.
8 Concluding remarks
Parallel distribution channels have improved consumer access to foreign media content in the past
(e.g., gray imports, video rentals) but online sharing represents a distinct phenomenon given its
immediacy, scale, and breadth of content. Our formal analysis has focused on the features of the
technology most relevant to the cross-border ﬂow of content, but other aspects will contribute to
shape its impact. Some types of content are more prone to be exchanged over online sharing than
others, or favor social consumption, or depend on real-time action. Online sharing will therefore
not impact all content uniformly, and should generate a media environment that is diﬀerent in
terms of market characteristics and content composition.
We expect demand-side policies to play an important role in fostering consumption of domes-
tic content going forward. Production subsidies may need to be reevaluated to account for lower
commercial revenues and could be channeled to new types of producers and content providers.
Governments could subsidize the consumption (rather than the production) of domestic content,
and the proliferation of commercial streaming services enables such subsidies to be carefully tar-
geted in order to increase their eﬀectiveness. Sponsoring of content portals for domestic production
could also prove eﬀective, and public broadcasters have begun to serve as a natural platform to
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develop such portals. The new media environment presents novel policy challenges but also novel
policy avenues, and will require a re-thinking of goals, needs, and tools.
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Appendix
We show that the implicit equations characterizing equilibrium entry f c in (11) and fm in (13)
have unique and well-deﬁned solutions. Recall that our analysis is based on the parameter range
where f > 3
2
t (which ensures the market is covered), q∗ > 5
8
(which ensures quotas are enforced in
the second stage, so that qˆuk > q¯k and qˆ
m
k > q¯k), and o < t/2f (which ensures symmetric pricing
holds in the online sharing equilibrium, posk = o). Consider ﬁrst the case of competitive entry in
the absence of online sharing,
f c =
√
t · quk (f c)
c
.
Plugging qˆuk from (7) in the above implicit equation and rearranging obtains a polynomial equation,
P (f c) = 0, where the polynomial P is given by
P (f) = 8c f 3 − 8ct f 2 − 8q∗t f + 5t2.
Note that P is a third degree polynomial, and therefore has three roots. Denote the three roots
by fI , fII , and fIII . Evaluating the polynomial subject to the constraints f >
3
2
t and q∗ > 5
8
reveals that fI < 0 < fII < t < fIII , and therefore fIII is the single candidate solution. Next, we
apply the intermediate value theorem to establish that fIII is a real root. Inspection reveals that
P (f) < 0 for f ∈ (fII , fIII) and P (f) > 0 for f > fIII . Therefore, by continuity, it must be the
case that fIII is a real root and we conclude that f
c = fIII .
Consider next the case of subsidized entry in the absence of online sharing, which is character-
ized by the following implicit equation
fm =
√
t · qmk (fm)
4c
.
Plugging qˆmk from (8) in the above implicit equation and rearranging obtains a polynomial equation
P ′(fm) = 0 where
P ′(f) = 32c f 3 − 8q∗t f + t2.
Denote the three roots of P ′ by f ′I , f
′
II , and f
′
III . To identify which roots constitute a valid solution
to the maximization problem of governments, we evaluate the second derivative of the objective
function at each of the three roots. Inspection reveals that ∂(G1 + G2 − 2 f c)/∂2f only obtains
negative values at f ′III . Therefore, f
′
I and f
′
II cannot be welfare-maximizing and f
′
III constitutes
the single candidate solution. Next, we establish that f ′III is a real root. Inspection of P
′(f) subject
to the constraints f > 3
2
t and q∗ > 5
8
reveals that P ′(f) < 0 for f ∈ (f ′II , f ′III) and P ′(f) > 0 for
f > f ′III , so continuity implies that f
′
III must be a real root.
Inspection of entry solution f c = fIII characterized above as well as entry solution f
os,c in (12)
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subject to the constraints f os,c > 3
2
t, as well as q∗ > 5
8
, and o < t/2f os,c reveals that f os,c < f c.
Moreover, inspection of entry solution fm = f ′III characterized above as well as entry solution
f os,m in (14) subject to the constraints f os,m > 3
2
t, as well as q∗ > 5
8
, and o < t/2f os,m reveals that
f os,m < fm. Finally, consider the number of content varieties consumed in each country, which
is given by nk in Proposition 1 in the absence of online sharing and by n
os
k in Proposition 2 in
its presence. Given the preceding parameter constraints on f , t, q∗, and o, it can be shown that
nosk (f
os,c) < nk(f
c) if and only if c > (5o−4q
∗)o2
(2o−1)t , and it is always the case that n
os
k (f
os,m) > nk(f
m).
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